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Abstract 
We construct a model that combines elements of endogenous growth with the 
convergence implications of the neoclassical growth model. In the long run, the world 
growth rate is driven by discoveries in the technologically leading economies. Followers 
converge toward the leaders because copying is cheaper than innovation over some 
range. A tendency for copying costs to increase reduces followers' growth rate and 
thereby generates a pattern of conditional convergence. We discuss how countries are 
selected to be technological leaders; and we assess welfare implications. Poorly defined 
intellectual property rights imply that leaders have insufficient incentive to invent and 
followers have excessive incentive to copy. 
KEY WORDS: Technological Diffusion, Convergence, Growth 
Model, R&D 
In the neoclassical growth model, per capita output grows in the long run only 
because of exogenous technological progress. The interesting insights about growth 
involve the convergence behavior along the transition path. Because of diminishing 
returns to capital, economies grow faster when they start further below their steady­
state positions. Thus, if the determinants of the steady-state positions are held fixed, 
then poorer places are predicted to grow faster in per capita terms. 1 This result--often 
described as conditional convergence--receives strong empirical support if the variables 
held constant include aspects of government policy. 2 
The recent endogenous growth theory, initiated by Romer (1987, 1990) and 
extended by Grossman and Helpman (1991, Chs. 3, 4) and Aghion and Howitt (1992), 
explains long-term growth from a model of technological progress. The private research 
that underlies commercial discovery is motivated along Schumpeterian lines by the flow 
of profit that accrues to an innovator. Since the profit flow depends on some form of 
monopoly power, the resulting equilibrium tends not to be Pareto optimal. 
The strong point of the recent theories is that they endogenize the rate of technical 
change, a variable that is unexplained in the neoclassical growth model. Thus, the long­
term growth rate becomes an endogenous variable that depends on the underlying 
parameters and disturbances in the model. However, the new theories are less attractive 
in that they tend to lose the prediction of conditional convergence. 
The present analysis links the long-term growth implications of the recent theories 
with the convergence implications of the neoclassical growth model. In the long run, 
growth depends on the discovery of new products or technologies in a few leading 
1The main references for the neoclassical model are Ramsey (1928), Solow (1956), Swan
(1956), Cass (1965), and Koopmans (1965). For an exposition, see Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1995, Chs. 1,2). 
2see, for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, Ch. 12). This kind of empirical analysisalso holds constant the initial stocks of human capital in the forms of education and health.These stocks affect an economy's rate of convergence to the steady state; see Mulligan and
Sala-i-Martin (1993), Caballe and Santos (1993), and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995,Ch. 5). 
2 
economies. The rates of invention and growth reflect the forces described by Romer 
(1990). 
For the behavior across economies, the key element is that imitation is typically 
cheaper than invention. Most countries therefore prefer to copy rather than invent. 
Moreover, the relatively low cost of imitation implies that the typical follower grows 
relatively fast and tends to catch up to the leaders. (This result holds in a conditional 
sense; that is, for given government policies and other variables that affect the return 
from the introduction of new technologies.) As the pool of copiable material decreases, 
the costs of imitation tend to rise and the follower's growth rate tends to fall. Hence, a 
pattern of conditional convergence emerges in this model of the diffusion of technology. 
This similarity with the neoclassical model applies because the increasing cost of 
imitation is analogous to the diminishing returns to capital. 
In the long run, all economies grow at the rate of discovery in the leading places. 
Thus, the rate of discovery plays the role in this model that the exogenous rate of 
technical change plays in the neoclassical model. The comparison of growth rates across 
countries reflects the conditional convergence behavior related to the costs of copying 
inventions. Thus, the cross-country implications are similar to those of the neoclassical 
model. 
I. Setup of the Model 
There are two countries, denoted by i=l,2. The production function in each 
country is of the Spence (1976)/Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) type: 
N. 
1 
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where O<a<l, Y. is output, L. is labor input, X.. is the quantity employed of the jth1 1 IJ 
type of nondurable intermediate good, and Ni is the number of types of intermediates 
available in country i. The technology shown in equation (1) can be accessed by all 
agents in country i, and production occurs under competitive conditions. The output in 
country 1 is physically the same as that in country 2. The total quantities of labor in 
each country, L1 and L2, are constants. 
The productivity parameter, Ai' can represent variations across countries in the 
level of technology; that is, differences in output that arise for given values of Ni, Li, 
and the X .. 's. In practice, however, the main source of differences in the A. is likely to 
~ 1 
be variations in government policies, as reflected in infrastructure services, tax rates, the 
degree of maintenance of property rights, and the rule of law. The effects of these 
policies on outcomes are analogous to those from pure differences in the levels of 
technology. Thus, the measures of government policy used in empirical studies, such as 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, Ch. 12), are empirical counterparts of the Ar 
Trade is assumed to be balanced between the two countries; that is, domestic 
output, Yi' equals total domestic expenditures. These expenditures are for 
consumption, Ci, production of intermediates, Xij' and R&D aimed at learning about 
new varieties of intermediates. An agent can learn by inventing a new type of good or 
by imitating a product that is known in the other country. 
Units of Ci or Xij each require one unit of Yr The invention of a new variety of 
product requires a lump-sum outlay of 77i units of Yr The assumed constancy of 77i 
means that the returns from the discovery of new types of products are constant. One 
reason that diminishing returns may not apply, offered by Romer (1993), is that the 
world may possess an infinite number of potentially useful ideas. In this case, increases 
in cumulated knowledge need not exhaust the opportunities for further learning. In 
addition, past learning may make future learning easier, a force that could create 
increasing returns (as well as possible externalities). In any event, the main results 
4 
about the diffusion of technology would not change if discoveries of new types of 
products did not involve precisely constant returns. The costs of imitation are 
considered later. 
Suppose, to begin, that country 1 is the technological leader, whereas country 2 is 
the follower. Specifically, N1(0)>N2(0), and all of the varieties of intermediates known 
initially in country 2 are also known in country 1. Assume, for now, that all discoveries 
of new types of products occur in country 1. Country 2 imitates the intermediate goods 
known in country 1 but does not invent anything. 
II. Innovation in Country 1 
The setup for country 1 is similar to that described in Romer (1990), Rivera-Batiz 
and Romer (1991 ), Grossman and Helpman (1991, Ch. 3), and Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1995, Ch. 6). An inventor of an intermediate of type j is assumed to retain a perpetual 
monopoly over the use of this good for production in country 1. (It is straightforward to 
allow the good to become competitive with an exogenous probability p per unit of time.) 
If intermediate j is priced in country 1 at P lj' then the flow of monopoly profit to the 
inventor is 
(2) 
where the 1 inside the parentheses represents the marginal cost of production for the 
intermediate. 
The production function in equation (1) implies that the marginal product of 
intermediate j in the production of output is 
5 
The equation of this marginal product to Plj yields the demand function for 
intermediate j from all producers of goods in country 1: 
(3) 
Substitution of the result for x1j into equation (2) and maximization of 1r1j with 
respect to P lj yields the monopoly price: 
(4) 
The monopoly price is the same at all points in time and for all types of intermediates. 
The result in equation ( 4) implies that the total quantity produced of 
intermediate j in country 1 is 
_ X _ L . A 1/(1-a). "'2/(1-a)(5) Xlj - 1 - 1 1 .... · 
This quantity is the same for all intermediates j and at all points in time (because 11 is 
constant). Substitution of the result from equation (5) into the production function in 
equation (1) implies that country l's total output is 
_ A 1/(1-a). 2a/(1-a). 1 N(6) Y1 - 1 a 1 1· 
Hence, output per person, y1:Y1/L1, rises with the productivity parameter, Al' and the 
number of varieties, N1. The variable N1 represents the state of technology in 
country 1. Increases in N1 lead to equiproportionate expansions in output per worker. 
Substitution from equations (4) and (5) into equation (2) implies that the flow of 
monopoly profit to the owner of the rights to intermediate j is 
6 
Since the profit fl.ow is constant, the present value of profits from date t onward is 
where r1(v) is the real interest rate at time v in country 1. 
If there is free entry into the R&D business and if the equilibrium quantity of 
R&D is nonzero at each point in time, then V1(t) must equal the constant cost of 
invention, 171' at each point in time. This condition implies that r1( v) is constant over 
time and given by 
(8) 
where 1r1 is given in equation (7). The rate of return, rl' is the ratio of the profit fl.ow, 
1rl' to the lump-sum cost, 171' of obtaining this profit fl.ow. 
Consumers in country 1 are of the usual Ramsey type with infinite horizons. At 
time O, these consumers seek to maximize 
(9) 
where p>O is the rate of time preference and O>O is the magnitude of the elasticity of 
the marginal utility of consumption. (The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is 
1/0.) The number of consumers-that is, population-is constant over time. 
Maximization of utility, subject to a standard budget constraint, leads to the usual 
formula for the growth rate of consumption: 
7 
(10) 
Since r1 is constant from equation (8), the growth rate of c1 is also constant. 
In the full equilibrium of this model, N1 and Y1 always grow at the same rate as 
c1 (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1995, Ch. 6]). If 11 denotes this common growth 
rate, then 
(11) 
where 1r1 is given in equation (7). Thus, all of the quantities in country I-including 
the number of known products, N1-grow at the constant rate 11. The parameters are 
assumed to be such that 11~0 holds in equation (11); that is, 1r1/.,,1 ~ p applies. 
Otherwise, the solution would violate the constraint that N1 cannot be decreasing, and 
the free-entry condition for R&D would not hold with equality. 3 Since 11 is constant, 
equation (6) shows that growth of N1 at the rate 11 is consistent with growth of Y 1 at 
the rate 11. 
m. Imitation in Country 2 
A. Setup of the Model 
The form of the production function, equation (1), is the same in country 2 as in 
country 1. Country 2 is technologically behind initially in the sense that N2(0)<N1(0). 
The parameters A2 and 12 and the innovation cost .,,2 may differ from their 
counterparts in country 1. The copying and adaptation of one of country 1 's 
intermediates for use in country 2 requires a lump-sum outlay v2(t), where v2(0)<'f/2, so 
that imitation is initially more attractive than innovation for country 2. 
3The transversality condition must also hold. This condition requires r1>11' which entails 
p > (1-0) · 1r1/ .,,1. Hence, the transversality condition must be satisfied if 0~ 1. 
8 
Since the cost of innovation is constant, the discoveries of new types of products do 
not encounter diminishing returns. As mentioned before, this assumption can be 
rationalized from the idea that the number of potential inventions is unbounded. 
Imitation differs from innovation in that the number of goods that can be copied 
at any point in time is limited to the finite number that have been discovered elsewhere. 
Specifically, country 2 can select for imitation only from the uncopied subset of the N1 
goods that are known in country 1. As N2 increases relative to N1, the cost of imitation 
is likely to rise. This property would hold, for example, if the products known in 
country 1 varied in terms of how costly they were to adapt for use in country 2. The 
goods that were easier to imitate would be copied first, and the cost v2 that applied at 
the margin would increase with the number already imitated. This property is captured 
here by assuming that v2 is an increasing function of N2/N1: 
(12) 
where v 1 >0. 42 
For N2/N1<1, the imitation cost v2 tends to be less than T/2 because copying is 
typically cheaper than discovery. But v2 can exceed T/2 when N2/N1<1 if the remaining 
pool of uncopied inventions comprises goods that are difficult to adapt to country 2's 
environment. In other words, it would be cheaper in some circumstances for a 
technological follower to start from scratch rather than adapt one of the leader's goods. 
Figure 1 shows, however, a simpler case in which v2(N2/N1)<TJ2 applies for N2/N1<1 
and v2(N2/N1) approaches T/2 as N2/N1 approaches 1. The main results still hold if 
v2(N2/N1)>TJ2 holds for a range of values N2/N1<l. 
4This formulation assumes that v2, which represents the cost of copying the marginal good, 
depends only on the state variable N2/ N 1. A more complicated approach would treat the 
cost of copying a newly discovered product as a random draw from some probability
distribution. 
9 
Suppose that an agent in country 2 pays v2(t) to imitate the jth variety of 
intermediate from country 1. We assume that this agent retains a perpetual monopoly 
right over the use of the intermediate for production in country 2. s The monopoly price 
is then P2j=P2=1/a, the same as that for country 1 in equation ( 4). The formulas for 
quantity produced, x2j, total output, Y2, and flow of profit, 1r2j, therefore parallel the 
expressions for country 1 from equations (5)-{7): 
The ratio of the per-worker products, yi' for the two countries is 
(16) 
Thus, the ratio depends on the relative value of the productivity parameters, A2/ A1, 
and on the relative value of the number of known varieties of intermediates, N2/N1. 
The corresponding ratio for the profit flows, 1r2/1r1, depends on A2/A1 and also on 
L2/L1. 
The effect from the relative labor endowments is a scale benefit. The relevant 
scale variable is the total of complementary factor input, Li, that the intermediates 
work with in country i. Market size, per se, does not matter in this model because final 
5Producers in country 2 are assumed to be unable to circumvent the local monopoly by
importing intermediate good j from country 1. Even if this intermediate could be 
purchased from abroad at a price below the monopoly level, the idea is that someone must 
make the lump-sum outlay v2 to learn how to use the good effectively in the environment 
of country 2. 
10 
goods are homogeneous and tradable internationally. The scale benefit from Li arises 
because the cost of invention or imitation is assumed to be a lump-sum amount for the 
entire economy (country 1 or country 2).6 
The present value of profits from imitation of intermediate j in country 2 is 
(17) 
where r2( v) is the rate of return in country 2 at time v. A gap in rates of return 
between the two countries, riv)#1, is possible because international lending has been 
ruled out. 7 If there is free entry into the imitation business in country 2 and if the 
equilibrium amount of resources devoted to imitation is nonzero at each point in time, 
then V2(t) must equal the cost of imitation, vit), at each point in time: 
(18) 
Substitution of the formula for V2(t) from equation (17) and differentiation of 
both sides of equation (18) with respect tot yields 
(19) 
6Becker and Murphy (1992), Quah (1994), and Alesina and Spolaore (1995) assume that 
increases in scale also entail costs. These costs involve coordination among agents, the 
processing of ideas, and heterogeneity in the preferences for public goods. In these settings, 
a group or country tends to have an optimal size, and an increase in scale beyond this point
does not convey a net benefit. 
7If international lending were permitted, then all current investment would flow to the R&D 
activity that offers the highest rate of return. Investments in more than one kind of R&D 
could coexist if the model were modified to include an inverse relation between the rate of 
return to R&D and the current amount of R&D spending. 
11 
Hence, if v2 were constant, then r2 wou
ld be constant and equal to 1r2/v2, the ratio of 
profit to the lump-sum cost of obtaining this profit. This result would parallel the 
formula for r1 in equation (8). However, i
f v2 varies over time, then r2 includes the 
capital-gain term, v /v2. With free entry, the monopoly right over an intermediate2 
good must equal the cost of obtaining it, v2. If v is rising (because N2/N1 is increasing2 
in equation [121), then the expanding value of the monopoly right implies a capital gain 
at the rate v /v2. This gain adds to the "dividend rate," 1r2/v2, to get the full rate of2 
return in equation (19). 
Consumers in country 2 are assumed to maximize Ramsey utility functions of the 
form specified in equation (9). Therefore, the growth rate of c2 is related to r2 in the 
usual way: 
(20) 
This result parallels the one for country 1 in equation (10). The preference parameters, 
p and 0, are assumed to be the same in the two countries. 
B. Steady-State Growth 
In the steady state, N2 grows at the same rate, 'Yl' as N1' so that v2 remains 
constant in accordance with equation (12). The ratio N2/N1 therefore equals a 
constant, denoted (N2/N1)*. Assume for now that the parameters are such that 
O<(N2/N1)*<1. The subsequent analysis rela





In the steady state, the growth rates of Y2 and c2 equal the growth rate of N2, 
which equals -y1. Therefore, the steady-state growth rates of all the 
quantities in 
* 
country 2, denoted by -y2, equal -y1. 
12 
Since c2 and c1 grow in the long run at the rate 11 and since the preference 
parameters, p and 0, are the same in the two countries, equations (8), (10), and (20) 
imply 
(21) 
where 1r1 is given in equation (7). Thus, although the two countries do not share a 
common capital market, the adjustment of N2/N1 to the value (N2/N1)*-which 
ensures 12 
* =11-implies r2 * =r1. In the long run, the process of technological diffusion 
equalizes the rates of return. 
* Since r2=r1, equations (19) and (8) imply 
* where v2 is the steady-state value of v2. The formulas for the profit flows from 
equations (15) and (7) therefore imply 
The assumption, thus far, is that country 2 never chooses to innovate. This 
behavior is optimal for agents in country 2 if v2(t)<772 applies along the entire path. 
Since v2 is an increasing function of N2/N1, the required condition (if N2/N1 starts 
* below its steady-state value) is 112<112, which implies from equation (22) 
(23) 
13 
In other words, country 2 has to be intrinsically inferior to country 1 in terms of the 
indicated combination of productivity parameters, A2/ Al' labor endowments, L2/Ll' 
and costs of innovating, 111/112. If the inequality in (23) holds, then country 2 never has 
an incentive to innovate (because v2[t]<¾ applies throughout). Moreover, country 1 
never has an incentive to imitate, because there never exists a pool of foreign goods to 
copy. Thus, if the inequality in (23) holds, then the equilibrium is the one already 
described in which country 1 is the perpetual leader and country 2 is the perpetual 
follower. We discuss in a later section the results when (23) does not hold. 
Suppose now that the function for the cost of imitation in equation (12) takes the 
constant-elasticity form: 
(24) 
for N2/N19, where u>O. Note that v2 approaches¾ as (N2/N1) approaches 1, the 
property assumed in Figure 1. The form in equation (24) is especially convenient for the 
dynamic analysis. 
Equations (22) and (24) imply that the steady-state ratio of N2 to N1 is given by 
The inequality in (23) implies (N2/N1)*<1. 
Since (N2/N1)*<1, equation (16) implies that y2 remains below y1 in the steady 
state if A2~A1. (Note that A2>A1 can be consistent with the inequality in [23] if 
L2<L1 or 112>111.) Thus, the follower country's per-worker output js likely to fall short 
of the leader's per-worker output even in the steady state. The potential to imitate 
therefore does not generally provide a strong enough force to equalize the levels of per­
worker product in the long run. 
14 
Consumption, c2, grows in the steady state at the constant rate 'Yp and the ratios 
C2/Y2 and c2/N2 remain constant. The levels of these ratios in the steady state can be 
ascertained from country 2's budget constraint: c2 equals total output, Y2 {from 
equation [14]), less the goods devoted to production of intermediates, N2X2 {where X2 is 
given in equation [13]), less the resources expended on imitation. The last amount is 
. * 
v2N2, which equals v2-y1N2 in the steady state. This budget condition can be used to 
determine (C2/N2)* and, hence, {C2/Y2)*. 
C. The Dynamic Path and Convergence 
The dynamic behavior for country 2 can be studied by considering differential 
equations for the variables c2 and N2. (Since Y2 is proportional to N2, from equation 
[14], the dynamics of Y2 are the same as those of N2.) For tractability, the analysis 
uses the constant-elasticity form of the cost function from equation {24). The 
* parameters are also assumed to satisfy the inequality in {23), so that 112<7'/2 and 
{N2/N1)*<1, as shown in Figure 1. 
One differential equation comes from the formula for consumption growth in 
equation (20), together with the expressions for the rate of return, r2, from equation 
{19) and the cost of imitation, 112, from equation (24). It is convenient to define the 
A 
variable N:N2/N1, which will be constant in the steady state. 8 The formula for 
consumption growth can then be expressed as 
(26) 
8This construction effectively filters out the growth of N1 at the constant rate -y1 from the 
solution for the growth rate of N2. The growth rate 11 plays a role for country 2 that is 
analogous to that of exogenous technological progress in the neoclassical growth model. 
15 
As mentioned before, the change in N2 is determined by the budget constraint: 
the resources devoted to imitation in country 2 equal total output, Y2 ( equation [14]), 
less consumption, c2, less the quantity of intermediates, N2X2 (where x2 is given in 
equation [13]). The change in N2 equals l/112 times the resources devoted to imitation, 
and the growth rate of N equals the growth rate of N2 minus 11. The resulting formula 
A 
for the growth rate of N is 
(27) 
where the new variable, 
will be constant in the steady state. Since Y 2 is proportional to N2 ( equation [14]), x2 
is proportional to the consumption-output ratio, C2/Y2.
9 
Substitution for N/N from equation (27) into equation (26) yields an expression for 
• A 
C2/C2 in which the only right-hand side variables are N and Xf 
Equations (27) and (28) imply that the growth rate of x2:C2/N2 is 
9Equations (13) and (14) imply that value added (output net of intermediates), Y2-N2X2, 
is proportional to N2. Therefore x2 is also proportional to the ratio of c2 to value added. 
16 
Equations (27) and (29) form a system of autonomous differential equations in the 
A 
variables N and x2. The steady state of this system has already been discussed in the 
previous section. The dynamics can be described by means of a standard two-
A 
dimensional phase diagram in (N,x2) space. 
A A 
Equation (27) implies that the locus for N=0 is downward sloping in (N,x2) space, 
A 
as shown in Figures 2 and 3. (Recall that 112 is an increasing function of N from 
equation [24].) Equation (27) also implies that the N =0 locus is stable; that is, an 
A A 
increase in N reduces N in the neighborhood of the locus. 
Equation (29) implies that the slope of the x2=0 locus depends on the sign of 0-u. 
If 0> u, then the locus is upward sloping, as shown in Figure 2. This locus is unstable; 
that is, an increase in x raises X· 
The directions of motion are shown by arrows for the four regions in Figure 2. The 
only path that avoids unstable behavior of N and x2 is the stable, saddle path, shown by 
A A A 
the dashed arrows. 10 If country 2 begins with N(0)<N*, then N and x2 each rise 
monotonically toward their steady-state values. 
Figure 3 deals with the case in which O<u. Equation (29) implies that the x2=0 
locus is now downward sloping and stable. (We can show that the slope of this locus is 
A 
always steeper in magnitude than that of the N =0 locus.) The key finding is that the 
stable, saddle path is again upward sloping; that is, N and x2 still rise monotonically 
A A 
during the transition from N(0)<N*.11 
1°The unstable paths can be ruled out as equilibria as in the neoclassical growth model (see 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1995, Ch. 2]). One new element in the present model is that N 
cannot decline if people cannot forget how to use a class of intermediate goods in 
production. The analogue in the neoclassical model is that gross investment cannot be 
negative; that is, the fall in the capital stock cannot exceed depreciation. 




Since x2 and N rise monotonically toward their steady-state values, equation (27) 
implies that N/N falls monotonically toward its steady-state value, 0. (The monotonic 
A 
rise of N implies a monotonic increase in v2.) Thus, during the transition, N2 grows 
faster than N --imitation is proportionately greater than innovation-but the growth1 
rate of N 2 falls steadily toward that of N 1. In the steady state, the rates of imitation 
A 
and innovation occur at the same rate, 'Yl' and N:N2/N1 remains constant. 
The follower's growth rate slows down during the transition because the imitation 
cost, v2, steadily increases. This increase in v2 represents a form of diminishing returns, 
in this case to imitation. In the standard neoclassical growth model, the diminishing 
returns to capital accumulation play an analogous role. 
The monotonic increase of N and monotonic decline of N/N imply a monotonic 
decline of C2/C2 in accordance with equation (26). Equation (20) therefore implies that 
r2 is monotonically decreasing; it falls steadily toward its steady-state value, r1. 
Since country 2's per-worker product, y2, is proportional to N2 (equation [14]), 
the growth rat~ of y 2 exceeds -r1 during the transition, but falls gradually toward -y1. 
Thus, the model exhibits the familiar convergence pattern in which the follower 
country's per-worker output grows faster than that of the leader, but the differential in 
the growth rates diminishes the more the follower catches up. 
As mentioned before, the follower's per-worker output, y2, is likely to fall short of 
the leader's, yl' in the steady state; that is, (y2/y1)*<1. Equations (16) and (25) imply 
that (y2/y1)* is an increasing function of A2/ A1 and L2/L1 and a decreasing function of 
112! 111 · 
IV. Constant (or Slowly Rising) Costs of Imitation 




imitation cost, 112, rises to a sufficient degree as N increases. Specifically, in Figure 1, 
* 
the condition is that 112 rise above 112 for N 
A 
:N2/N1< 1. (The property that 112 
approaches T/2 as N2/N1 approaches 1 is not important here.) Figure 4 deals with an 
* alternative case in which 11 is constant and low, so that 112<112. The analysis would be2 
similar if 112 were instead slowly rising, so that 11 approaches (from the left) a value2 
* below 112 as N2/N1 approaches 1. 
* Intuitively, if 11 is small (in particular, below 112), then the imitation process will2 
carry on at a sufficient pace to exhaust eventually all of the available products 
discovered in country 1. That is, N=l will be reached at some finite date T. At this 
point, there will be an excess supply of persons willing to pay 112 to copy one of 
country 1 's discoveries, which continue to flow in at the rate 11. Somehow, this excess 
supply has to be eliminated in the equilibrium. Moreover, for t<T, where N<l, agents 
in country 2 realize that a state of excess supply will arise later, and their previous 
choices of rates of imitation must be consistent with this expectation. 
A. The Steady State 
It is easiest to begin at the end; that is, when t>T, so that N=l has already been 
attained. In this case, the natural conjecture from the previous analysis is that 
country 2 would be in a steady state in which N2 grows at the rate 'Yl' the growth rate 
of N 1, so that N = 1 applies forever. In this situation, the goods discovered in country 1 
are immediately copied for use in country 2. Also, c2 grows at the rate 11, so that 
x2:C2/N2 remains fixed over time. 
Suppose, however, that r2 equals 1r2/112, the value implied by equation (19) when 
11 is constant. In this case, r2>r1 applies. 
12 But r2>r1 implies that c2 would grow2 
faster than 'Yl' the growth rate of c1, so that country 2 would not be in a steady state. 
* 12Recall that r1=1r1/TJ1 and 112<112 in Figure 4. The result r2>r1 follows from the expression 
* for 11 in equation (22). 2 
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The problem is that making copies at the low cost v is too good a deal to be consistent2 
with the growth of c2 and N2 at the steady-state rate, 11. If the rate of return were 
1r2/ v2, then agents in country 2 would want to devote enough resources to copying so 
that N2 would grow at a rate faster than 11. But, since new goods are discovered only 
at the rate 'Yl' there is insufficient copiable material available to support imitation at 
this fast a rate. Somehow the rate of return in country 2 must be bid down to r1 to 
support the allocations that arise in the steady state. 
If N2=N1 and imitators in country 2 expend the flow of resources v211N1, then N2 
would grow along with N1 at the constant rate 11. However, if each individual in 
country 2 thinks that he can copy a good just by paying v2, then the amount spent on 
copying would exceed v21 N1; that is, there would be excess demand for goods to be1 
copied. We suppose in this excess-demand situation that the monopoly rights to the 
copied goods in country 2 are allocated in a random manner. Specifically, we assume 
that each person's probability of obtaining the property right is proportional to the 
amount spent on copying effort. In equilibrium, the total flow of resources expended by 
potential imitators must then be v * 2-y Nl' where v * 2>v is the cost per good that drives1 2 
the expected rate of return down to r1 (see equations [21] and [22] and Figure 4). 
13 This 
*bidding up of the effective cost of copying to v2 deters any further entry of potential 
imitators. 
* In the steady state, the effective cost of copying is v2>v2, and the expected rate of 
return to imitation is r1. This rate of return is consistent with growth of c2 and N2 at 
the steady-state rate, 11. The steady-state solution is therefore the same as that shown 
*in Figure 1, except that (N /N1)*=1 applies. (We continue to assume that 112>v2, as2 
shown in Figure 4; that is, the inequality in [23] holds.) 
13This result holds if the risk involved in imitation success is diversifiable, so that potential
imitators consider only the expectation of the return. 
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B. Transitional Dynamics 
Consider now the situation when t<T, so that N2<N1, and the copiable products 
are in plentiful supply. The rate of return in country 2 must then be 
{30) 
which is constant. The growth rate of consumption is therefore also constant and given 
by 
(31) 
This result corresponds to equation (26) with o-=0.14 
A A 
The formula for N/N is the same as equation (27) and that for x2/x2 is the same 
as equation (29) with u set to zero: 
where x2:C2/N2. 
Equations (27) and (32) and be used, as before, to construct a phase diagram in 
A 
(N,x2) space. Figure 5 shows the resulting diagram. Note that each locus is now a 
A 
horizontal line. We can show readily (if 1r2/v2 > r1) that the N=0 locus lies above the 
14In equation (24), u=O implies that v2 is independent of N2/N1. However, in the present 
case, v2<'T/2 also applies. 
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x2=0 locus, as shown in the figure. We also have that N is falling for values above the 
N=O locus and rising for values below it, whereas x2 is rising for values above the x2=0 
locus and falling for values below it. These patterns imply that the stable, saddle path 
begins between the two horizontal loci and is then upward sloping. We have drawn the 
A 
path so that it remains below the N=O locus when N reaches 1, a configuration that is 
implied by the subsequent analysis. 
Figure 5 implies a transition in which N and x2 increase monotonically. The rise 
in N means that N2/N2 exceeds , 1 along the path. The expansion of x2 implies from 
equation (27) that N2/N2 declines steadily. Thus, the solution accords with the 
previous one in predicting that the follower grows faster (in terms of number of known 
products and output) than the leader, but the gap in the growth rates diminishes as the 
follower catches up. Note, however, that c2/c2 is constant at a value that exceeds , 1 
(see equation [31]). 
The tricky part of the solution concerns the behavior just at time T, when N 
*reaches 1. Just to the right of this point, imitations effectively cost v2>v2, and the rate 
of return is r1. Just to the left of this point, imitations cost v2, and the rate of return 
(from equation [30]) is 1r2/v2 > r1. Anyone who pays v2 to imitate a good just before 
date Twill, in the next instant, experience a sharp capital gain corresponding to the 
*increase in the shadow price of an imitated product from v2 to v2. In fact, the rate of 
return to copying a good is infinite for an instant of time at date T. This curious 
behavior for the instantaneous rate of return supports the equilibrium for quantities 
when the cost of copying is small and constant. 
Figure 6 shows the full path of the equilibrium for country 2's rate of return, r2, 
and log of consumption, log(C2). To the left of date T, the rate of return is constant at 




right of date T, the rate of return is constant at the lower value, r1=1r1/T/1' and the 
slope oflog(C ) is the correspondingly smaller value, (l/0)•(1r1/T/1 -p). At time T, the2 
infinite rate of return (for an instant of time) supports a jump in the level of log(C2). 
This jump is consistent with the economy's overall resource constraint, because the 
amount expended on imitation jumps downward at the same time by an equal amount. 15 
Note that there is no jump at time T (or any other time) in the level of total output. 
Suppose now that v2 were slowly rising, rather than constant, but that the value of 
A * 
v2 at N =1 remains below v2. In this case, the behavior at time T still involves an 
infinite rate of return and a jump in the level of consumption. The main new results are 
that r2 will fall steadily for t<T, and the growth rate of c2 will therefore also decline in 
this range. 
The bottom line is that cases of constant or slowly rising imitation costs agree 
qualitatively with the model from the previous section in the predictions about the 
follower's growth rates. In each case, a lower value of N2/N1 implies a higher growth 
rate of N 2 and, hence, of Y 2. This property extends also to the growth rate of c2, 
except for the case in which the imitation cost, v2, does not rise at all until N2 reaches 
N1 at date T. 
15The change in the resources devoted to imitation involves two offsetting effects. First, the 
resource use falls because the growth rate of N2 declines by a discrete amount. Second, the 
* resource use rises because each unit now costs v2>v2. In the equilibrium (which involves 
an infinite rate of return at date T and, hence, an upward jump in consumption), the net 
effect must be a reduction in resource use for imitation. Also, the stable, shadow path 
shown in Figure 5 must remain below the N=O locus at date Tin order to be consistent 
A 
with the downward jump in N and the upward jump in x2 at date T. (The loci for N=O 
and x =0 shift after date T--downward and upward, respectively-because v is replaced2 2 
* in the equations by the higher value v2.) 
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V. General Implications for Growth Rates in Follower Countries 
The various models considered imply that the growth rate of output per worker in 
country 2 can be written in the form 
(33) 
where the partial derivatives of the function G satisfy G1<0 and G2>0, and G( •, • )=0 
when y2/y1=(y2/y1)*. Growth rates do not necessarily exhibit absolute convergence, in 
the sense described by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, Ch. 1), because y2/y2<'Y1 can 
apply if y2/y1<L If (y2/y1)* is small-for example, because A2/A1 is low-then 
y2/y2 can be below 'Yl even if y2 is substantially less than y1. Country 2's growth rate, 
The results exhibit conditional convergence, in the sense that y2/y2 rises as y2/y1 
falls for a given value of (y2/y1)*. Also, for given y2/yl' y2/y2 rises with (y2/y1)*. 
For example, if the government of country 2 adopts policies that are more favorable to 
production and investment-such as lower tax rates or more effective enforcement of 
property rights-then the change amounts to an increase in A2. Hence, (y2/y1)* 
increases, and the growth rate, y2/y2, rises. 
In the neoclassical growth model with labor-augmenting technological progress, as 
described in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, Ch. 2), the formula for the growth rate of 
per capita output in a closed economy looks similar to equation (33). The differences 
are that 'Yl is replaced by the rate of exogenous technical change, denoted by x; y /y is2 1 
replaced by y, the country's output per effective worker (a concept that takes account of 
A 
the growth at rate x because of technological progress); and (y2/y1)* is replaced by y*, 
the steady-state level of output per effective worker. Thus, the growth formula in the 
standard model can be written as 
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(34) y/y =X + H(y, y*), 
where the partial derivatives of the function H satisfy H1<0 and H2>0, and H( •, • )=0 
,. 
when y=y*. The value y* depends on elements included in the parameter A, such as 
,. 
government policies, and on the willingness to save. Higher values of A raise y*, 
,. 
whereas higher values of the preference parameters, p and 0, reduce y*. 
One distinction between the two classes of models is that the intercept in equation 
(33) is "Yp the growth rate of the leading economy (or economies), whereas that in 
equation (34) is x, the constant rate of exogenous technological progress. Operationally, 
11 might be identified with the average growth rate
 of output per worker in a set of 
advanced countries. 16 The parameter x would not be directly observable and might vary 
over time or across countries. 
If all followers have the same leaders-because the costs of imitation, vi, are the 
same in all cases-and if the rates of exogenous technical change are the same for all 
countries at a given point in time, then both models imply that the intercept is the same 
for all countries. In a single cross section, equation (33) would constrain the intercept to 
equal the observable value "Yp whereas equation (34) would not impose this constraint. 
Thus, the diffusion model would, in this respect, amount to a restricted version of the 
neoclassical growth model. 
In a panel setting, equation (33) would allow the intercept to vary over time, but 
only in line with the observable changes in 11. Equation (34) would fix the intercept, 
but only if we retain the version of the neoclassical growth model in which the rate of 
16Followers are influenced by the growth of N 1, not by the growth of the leader's ou
tput per 
worker, y1, although the two growth rates coincide in the pr
esent model. In a setting that 
allows for short-term fluctuations of y 1 for given N1, the growth rate of N would likely b
e
1 
better estimated by a long-term average of the growth rate of y1, rather than the current
 
growth rate. Direct measures of N 1 would not generally be available, although patents or 
cumulated R&D spending would be possibilities. 
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technological progress, x, is constant (as well as the same for all countries). H the rate 
of technical change is exogenous, but not necessarily constant, then equation (34) would 
allow the intercept to vary over time in an unconstrained manner. In this case, the 
diffusion model would again amount to a constrained version of the neoclassical growth 
model. 
With respect to the terms G( •) and H( •),the key aspect of equation {33) is that 
the growth rate depends on a country's characteristics expressed relative to those in the 
leading economy (or economies), whereas equation (34) involves the absolute levels of 
these characteristics. Suppose, for example, that the growth rate, 'Yl' in the United 
States-the representation of the technological leader-is 2% per year. Equation {33) 
says that, for given 'Yl' the growth rate of a typical follower, say Mexico, depends on the 
quality of its political and economic institutions ( determinants of the parameter A.)
1 
expressed relative to those in the United States. Equation (34) says that the 
characteristics of Mexican institutions matter for Mexican growth, but it is not 
necessary to condition these characteristics on the comparable attributes of the United 
States. 
If all countries have the same leader, then, in a single cross section, the leader's 
characteristics merge into the overall intercept. In a panel context, changes in the 
leader's characteristics shift the intercept over time. The problem, however, is that the 
intercept can shift for other reasons. For example, in the neoclassical growth model, 
variations in the world rate of exogenous technological progress would be a source of 
these shifts. 
Clear empirical distinctions between the diffusion model and the standard 
neoclassical growth model arise if countries differ in terms of their relevant leaders, for 
example, because the cost of imitation, vi' depends on physical distance or on the 
degrees of similarity in language or culture. In a cross section of countries, the growth 
rate 'Yi then depends on country i's characteristics expressed in relation to those of a set 
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of potential leaders. The characteristics of these leaders would be weighted in 
accordance with measures, such as distance, that proxy for the cost, vi' of adapting 
technology. Results of Chua (1993) and Easterly and Levine (1994) on the growth 
effects of neighboring countries relate to this idea, although these studies focus on 
influences from physically adjacent places. 
VI. Switchovers of Technological Leadership 
We have considered thus far the case in which 
(A2/A1)1/(l-a).(L /L )-(17 /17 )<1, so that country 2 is intrinsically inferior to2 1 1 2 
country 1 in terms of the underlying parameters. This inequality guarantees in 
* Figures 1 and 4 that v2 lies below 172 on the vertical axis. For this reason, agents in 
country 2 never wish to innovate. 
Suppose now that the inequality is reversed, 
(35) 
so that country 2 is intrinsically superior to country 1. Since N2(0)<N1(o) still applies, 
country 2 again begins in a technologically inferior state. This situation would arise if, 
for example, country 2 had been inferior to country 1 for a long time, but a recent 
improvement in government policy-say an increase in A2 relative to A1-made 
country 2 intrinsically superior. 
Return now to the case shown in Figure 1 in which v2 rises with N2/N1 and 
approaches 172 as N2/N1 approaches 1. The inequality in (35) implies, however, that the 
* value v2 given in equation (22) now exceeds 172. Thus, Figure 7 shows that N2/N1 
reaches unity and correspondingly v2 reaches 1'/2 at a point where the cost of increasing 




raise N2/N1 above unity by innovating at the cost ,,2. Thus, once all of country l's 
discoveries have been copied, country 2 switches to innovation. 
The inventions in country 2 create a pool of products that can be imitated by 
country 1. Since the cost of copying is lower than ,,1, agents in country 1 now find 
imitation preferable to invention. Country 1's role shifts accordingly from leader to 
follower. 11 Note that country 1 's welfare will be enhanced by the presence of the 
technologically superior country 2.1s 
The initial model applies after the switchover with the roles reversed: country 2 is 
now the permanent technological leader, and country 1 is the permanent follower. 
Country 2's rate of return, r2, and growth rate, 1 (of N2, Y2, and C2), are constant2 
after the switchover. The values of r2 and 1 are given, respectively, by equations (8)2 
and (11) if the subscripts in the formulas are changed from 1 to 2. The steady-state 
ratio of numbers of products, (N2/N1)*, is still given by equation (25), but now exceeds 
unity. 
Figures 2 and 3 describe the post-switchover dynamics for country 1 if N now 
A 
equals N1/N2 and x1 replaces x2. The only difference from before is that N starts at 
A 
unity, a value to the right of N*. The dynamic path therefore features steadily declining 
A 
values of N and x1:C1/N1. The steady fall in N means that country 2 continues to 
A 
grow faster than country 1 during the post-switchover transition. As N falls, the cost, 
vl' for imitation in country 1 declines, and the rate of return and growth rates in 
171n the specification where viN2/N1) approaches¾ as N2/N1 approaches 1 (as in 
Figures 1 and 7), country 1 switches all at once from leader to follower, and country 2 
moves all at once from follower to leader. The switchover involves a transition with 
mixing of innovation and imitation within a country if v2(N2/N1) rises above 772 before 
N2/N1 reaches 1. (An analogous cost function for imitation would apply to country 1.) In 
this revised formulation, country 2 would switch at some point from pure imitation to a 
mixture of imitation and innovation. Then, after a finite stock of country 2's discoveries 
had built up, the cost of imitation by country 1 would become low enough so that 
country 1 would shift to a mixture of imitation and innovation. Eventually, country 2 
would move fully out of imitation, and country 1 would move fully out of innovation. 
18Since final product is physically homogeneous, there is no possibility in this model of an 
adverse relative-price effect for country 1 because of the rise in productivity in country 2. 
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country 1 increase. In the steady state, country 1's rate of return reaches r2, a constant, 
and its growth rate (of Nl' Y1' and c1) reaches -r2, also a constant. 19 
The switch of technological leadership can occur only once in the model if the 
underlying parameters A., L., and 'f'/· do not change. The switch occurs if the countryl l l 
that starts with the relatively low number of known products, Ni, is intrinsically 
superior in the sense of the inequality in (35). Thus, the present framework differs from 
models of leapfrogging, as explored by Brezis, Krugman, and Tsiddon (1993) and 
Ohyama and Jones (1993). In those settings, the changes in technological leadership 
reflect the effects of backwardness on the willingness to explore and adopt radically new 
ideas. In the present model, the countries that start out behind have a benefit from low 
costs of imitation, but have no advantages with respect to the discovery or 
implementation of leading-edge technologies. 
In practice, the parameters Ai' Li, and 7Ji would change over time; for example, 
because of shifts in government policies. These movements would occasionally create 
changes in the positions of technological leadership. (These changes would be lagged 
substantially from the shifts in the underlying parameters.) However, since 
backwardness does not enhance the discovery or implementation of new technologies and 
since the leaders are selected for the favorable values of their underlying parameters, 
there would be no tendency for a particular follower eventually to surpass a particular 
leader. In contrast, the probability that a leader would eventually be overtaken by some 
follower would likely be high. 
These results seem consistent with the broad patterns of change in world 
technological leadership that are highlighted by Brezis, Krugman, and Tsiddon (1993). 
19The final possibility is that the parameter combination A. l/(l-o)L.17. is the same for the
l l l 
two countries. In this case, the equilibrium can be of the first type ( where country 1 is the 
permanent leader and country 2 the permanent follower) or of the second type (where the 
leadership positions change). There could also be a mixture of invention and imitation in
the two places. In the steady state, agents in both countries are indifferent between 
innovation and imitation. 
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They argue that Great Britain overtook the Netherlands as leader in the 1700s, the 
United States (and, in some respects, Germany) overtook Great Britain by the late 
1800s, and Japan surpassed the United States in some sectors in recent years. The 
striking aspect of this pattern is not that changes in technological leadership occur, but 
rather that the positions at the top persist for so long. In particular, most countries 
have never been technological leaders. The empirical evidence therefore does not 
suggest any great benefits from backwardness, per se, in the discovery and use of the 
newest technologies. 
Vll. Welfare Considerations 
Consider the model described in Figure 1 in which country 1 is always the 
technological leader, country 2 is always the follower, and the cost of imitation is 
increasing in N2/N1. One source of distortion in this model involves the monopoly 
pricing of the intermediates that have already been discovered in country 1 or imitated 
in country 2. This element is familiar from the models of Romer (1990), Rivera-Batiz 
and Romer (1991), and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, Ch. 6). From a static 
perspective, the distortion reflects the excess of the price paid for each intermediate, 
1/a, over the marginal cost of production, 1. This wedge can be eliminated by using a 
lump-sum tax in each country to subsidize purchases of intermediates at the rate 
(1-a)/ a. Each user of an intermediate then faces a net price of one, the marginal cost 
of production.20 
Another distortion in the present framework is that agents in country 1 have 
insufficient incentive to innovate because they do not take account of the benefit to 
20in a one-country version of the present model, this subsidy to the purchase of intermediateswould be sufficient to achieve a Pareto optimum because a new invention does not affectthe rentals of the existing monopolists. In other models, such as Aghion and Howitt (1992)and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, Ch. 7), inventions destroy the rentals of the existingtechnological leaders. This element tends to make the privately chosen growth rate too
high. The achievement of a Pareto optimum then requires an additional intervention, suchas a tax on R&D. In Romer (1990), R&D has direct spillover benefits, so that a Paretooptimum necessitates a subsidy to R&D. 
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country 2 from an increase in the pool of copiable ideas. This effect would be 
internalized if each innovator in country 1 retained the international property rights 
over the use of his or her idea. In one setting, the inventor would subsequently adapt 
the intermediate for use in country 2. The initial R&D decision then considers the 
world market, which consists here of a combination of countries 1 and 2. The 
corresponding lumJHum cost of acquisition is the invention cost, ,.,1, plus the expense for 
adaptation of the discovery to country 2. (In some cases, adaptation will be too 
expensive to be worthwhile, and the results will be the same as those derived earlier for 
country 1.) 
The innovator's adaptation of a new product to another country amounts to 
technology transfer through foreign direct investment. The results would be equivalent 
if an inventor from country 1 licensed the idea to an entrepreneur in country 2. In 
either case, the guarantee of intellectual property rights motivates researchers to 
consider the worldwide benefits of their inventions. 
Another distortion arises in the model because agents in country 2 do not consider 
that the imitation of one of country 1's ideas raises the cost that will apply to future 
imitations. To isolate this effect, suppose that N1 grows at the given rate 11 and that 
the effect from monopoly pricing in country 2 has been neutralized by a subsidy at the 
rate (1-o)/ o on the use of intermediates. This subsidy, financed by a lump-sum tax, 
implies that the net price of intermediates to users is one, the marginal cost of 
production. We can then compare the outcomes of a decentralized solution with those 
that would be determined by a social planner in country 2. 
The social planner seeks to maximize the utility of the representative consumer in 
country 2, subject to the production function in equation (1); the specification of the 
cost of copying v2, assumed to be given by equation (24); and the growth rate of N1 at 
the given rate 11. The optimal quantity of each intermediate, X2, maximizes output, 
Y2, net of the outlay on intermediates, and is given by 
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(36) 
The usual conditions for dynamic optimization lead to the following expressions for 




In a decentralized situation in which purchases of intermediates are subsidized at the 
rate (1-o:)/o:, 'IJ1 turns out to equal the profit flow, 1r2. (This amount exceeds the value 
for 1r2 shown in equation [15].) 
For the decentralized setting, the subsidy on purchases of intermediates implies 
that x2 equals the social-planner's choice shown in equation (36). Since the values of 
x2 are equal, the decentralized path for N2 would coincide with the planner's path if the 
choices of x2 were the same. That is, the formula that determines N2/N2 in the 
decentralized case is the same as equation (37). Differences in results arise only because 
of differences in the choices of consumption. 
The growth rate of consumption in the decentralized solution turns out to be 
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This expression differs from the social-planner's result in equation (38) only by the term 
that involves w-x2. It is possible to show that W>x2applies in the steady state. 
Moreover, since x2 can be shown to be monotonically increasing during the transition 
(from the type of phase-diagram analysis used before), w-x2must be positive 
. 
throughout. It follows that the decentralized choice of c2/c2 is greater than the 
social-planner's value at all values of N /N (and, hence, 112). In other words, the2 1 
decentralized solution involves lower levels of x2 and higher growth rates of c2. 
Equation (37) then implies that the decentralized choice of N2/N2 is greater than the 
social-planner's choice at each value of N /N1. This result implies that the steady­2 
state value of N2/N1 in the decentralized solution exceeds the steady-state value chosen 
by the social planner.21 
The growth rate is too high in the decentralized solution because the allocation of 
resources to imitation (and, hence, growth) is analogous to increased fishing in a 
congestible pond. Specifically, an agent that expends 112(N2/N1) to raise N does not2 
consider that this action will raise the cost faced by future imitators of products. 
Viewed alternatively, private agents count the capital gain, 112/112, as part of the return 
to imitation, whereas this element does not enter into the social return. This kind of 
distortion would not arise if potential imitators in country 2 were somehow assigned 
well-defined property rights at the outset to the goods that could be copied from 
country 1. Alternatively, the distortion would not arise if the inventors in country 1 
possessed these rights of adaptation to country 2. 
We can make analogous welfare comparisons for the case discussed in section IV in 
which 112 is low and constant. In the steady state, the social planner's and decentralized 
solutions each feature N2/N1=1 with N2 and c2 growing at the rate -y1. However, in 
the decentralized case, the competition among potential copiers drives the effective cost 
21The parameters are assumed to be such that N2/N1 remains below unity in the steady 
state. 
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* of imitation up to v2>v2. This waste of resources implies that the steady-state level of 
x2:.C2/N2 is lower than in the social planner
1s setting. (This result holds even if the 
decentralized solution involves the appropriate subsidy for the use of intermediates in 
country 2.) 
Recall that, when N2=N1 was attained at time Tin the decentralized case, c2 
jumped upward, and the resources devoted to copying jumped downward 
correspondingly. We can show that the solution for the social planner in country 2 
entails no such jumps. The growth rate of c2 falls discretely at time T, but the level of 
c2-a.nd, hence, the amount of resources spent on copying-do not jump. 
For t<T, we can shown that the decentralized choice for N2/N2 exceeds the social 
planner's value. (This result holds if the decentralized solution involves the appropriate 
subsidy on the use of intermediates in country 2.) The values for C2/c2 are the same 
(and constant) in the two environments, but the decentralized path features lower levels 
of x2:C2/N2 and correspondingly higher levels of resources devoted to copying, v2N2. 
Again, the problem is the excessive incentive to secure property rights in the 
follower country. In the model with smoothly rising costs of copying, v2, this incentive 
is communicated by a stream of capital gains to holders of monopoly rights in country 2. 
In the model with constant v2, the inducement comes from the prospect of an infinite 
rate of capital gain for an instant at time T. Either way, the capital gains motivate 
imitation at too fast a rate. 
VITI. Concluding Observations 
Our analysis of invention and imitation combines features of endogenous-growth 
models with the convergence implications of the neoclassical growth model. In the long 
run, the world's growth rate is driven by discoveries in the technologically leading 
economies. Followers converge at least part way toward the leaders because copying is 
cheaper than innovation over some range. As the pool of uncopied ideas diminishes, the 
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cost of imitation tends to increase, and the followers' growth rates tend accordingly to 
decline. Therefore, the results exhibit a form of conditional convergence, a property 
found in the cross-country data on economic growth. 
The outcomes deviate from Pareto optimality for reasons that involve the 
publicness of discoveries, imperfect competition, and limited specification of property 
rights. We stress the consequences from the absence of intellectual property rights 
across economies. In this context, the leading places tend to have insufficient incentive 
to invent, and the follower places tend to have excessive incentive to copy. 
In the long run, the identities of the technological leaders and followers are also 
endogenous. In the present model, the private reward from innovation depends on its 
complementarity with domestic production possibilities. (It is not possible to invent 
things and retain control over their use in other places.) Therefore, the technological 
leader is selected in the long run in accordance with the attractiveness of the local 
environment for production and research (high parameter A. and low parameter f'/·) and 
1 1 
with the scale of complementary domestic inputs (high Li). We suggest that 
government policies on security of property rights, taxation, and infrastructure are 
ultimately key determinants of an area's attractiveness for production and research (the 
parameters Ai and 11/ However, our analysis takes these government policies as 
exogenous, because we lack a theory about the convergence or divergence of government 
policies across countries or regions. 
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Figure 1. Cost of Technological Change in Country 2 
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Figure 5. Phase Diagram for Country 2 when v is constant (cr = 0)
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Figure 6. Time Paths of r2 and log(c2) 
















Figure 7. Cost of Technological Change in Country 2 
(for the environment in which v2 > 11 )2 
